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SOUTH AFRICA: THE ELECTIONS AND THE PATH AHEAD 
By Prexy Nesbill 
Senior Program Officer 
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation 
July, 1994 
For Don M.--Banned 
it is a dry white season 
dark leaves don't last, their brief lives dry out 
and with a broken heart they dive down gently headed for the earth, 
not even bleeding. 
it is a dry white sea5on hrother, 
only the trees know the pain as they still stand erect 
dry like steel, their branches dry like wire, 
indeed, it is a dry white season 
but seasons come to pass. 
For three days in April of 1994 and for the first time in history, South Africans of all 
races voted in national and provincial elections. People turned out in breathtaking 
numbers, providing the world with an astounding demonstration of mass political 
participation. Many people walked 20-30 miles to vote and in some cases, due to 
organizational problems, were forced to return hon1e only to come back the next 
n1orning in order to vote. Some people, frail and sickly, were carried in chairs, 
wheelbarrows, and on shoulders. They waited on the damp ground or on cold, dirt 
school floors for hours until thei.r turn can1e for casting their ballot. This election was 
unlike anything conducted in the west. People were not just voting for a program or a 
candidate. It was a ballot for liberation. For the remainder of my life I will consider 
myself honored to have participated in those three days. So often I have been asked 
what it was like to have been there. Rarely have I been able to respond with any words 
or sentences which even begin to capture all that those three days meant. 
Looking back now at ,ny South Africa diary, I finally understand what my uncle felt 
when describing his participation in the Internationa.1 Brigade's defense of Republican 
Spain in the 1930's. He didn't say much, but often when he spoke about it, the tears 
welled up in his eyes and it confused and frightened us. Now I know his tears. 
ln less than four months, South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), at a 
cost of approximately 700 million rand ($200 million), set up more than 9,000 polling 
stations and 1,200 counting stations nationwide. They were staffed by 171,000 personnel 
plus an additional 13,000 staff who had to be trained and stationed in Natal in less than 
four days. Following the last minute decision of Gatsha Buthelezi's lnkatha Freedo1n 
Party(IFP) to participate in the elections, the IEC immediately scra,nbled LO set up 
polling stations in the Natal area and 10 redesign the ballots to include the IFP. \Vitb an 
estimated 23 111illio11 eligible voters, as many IFP stickers had Lo be produced and stuck 
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to the ballots. ln addition, there were 10,000 official monitors, 1,770 United Nations 
observers, 320 European Union observers and more than 2,000 foreign journalists 
requiring the attention of the IEC. Ao additional and significant group of observers, 
many of whom were also peace monitors, came through the Ecumenical Monitoring 
Project of South Africa (EMPSA) run by the World Council of Churches and __ the South 
; - . African Council of Churches. · · 
The first day of the three-day elections, Tuesday April 26, was set aside for people with 
special needs and the elderly. One innovative approach by some IEC officials was to 
conduct voter education workshops in hospitals. In many areas throughout the country, 
1nobile polling stations were set up to allow hospital patients, old age home inhabitants, 
and prisoners to vote. Reaching out to the jails and prisons was very important; in many 
regions prisoners had to go on strike in order to get the right to vote. Many people 
waited for a full day in polling station lines to vote. "A short wait," said many, 
"compared to waiting for the end of 300 years of oppression under whites." The IEC was 
criticized because numerous polling stations had not received enough ballots and/or 
stickers. Voting was extended for an extra day in KwaZulu and other selected regions to 
ensure that everyone got a chance to cast their ballot. 
The biggest fear throughout the months leading to the elections was that they would 
accelerate the country's armed conflict which, with over 13,000 people dead fron1 
politically-related violence, was already engulfing the entire nation'. In the n1onth prior 
to the elections more than 30 people were gunned down on the East Rand (Tbokoza and 
Vosloorus) and more than one hundred in the Natal region. On Marcb.28, violence 
came to downtown Johannesburg in the form of an Inkatha-orchestrated offensive aimed 
at Shell House, the headquarters of the African National Congress. By the end of the 
day 56 people bad been killed and more than 400 injured. As the election date drew 
nearer, bomb attacks began to take place all over South Africa. In late March, bombs 
were placed in a squatter camp in an area called Ventersdorp where voter education 
training was taking place. On Sunday, the 24th of April, a car bomb exploded in 
downtown Johannesburg killing 11 people and destroying th~ buildings in a two square 
block area. Simultaneously, 11 other bo1nbings took place in Johannesburg at taxi ran.ks 
and places designated as polling stations. Numerous bombings took place in almost all 
provinces of South Africa; it was evident that this was a concerted, well-organized effort 
to disrupt the voting process countrywide. 
10n March 18th, the Goldstone Commb,~ion of Inguiry Regarding the Prevention 
of Public Violence and Intimidation released a report that officially acknowledged for 
the first time that a ''Third Force" involving senior men1bers of the South African Police 
(SAP) had been involved in hit squad activities in Natal and the Transvaal; and, 
additionally, had carried out many of the killings on conunuter trains where more than 
300 black people were killed between 1990 and 1992. 
' 
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I saw first-hand the terror that a well placed bomb can bring about. I was standing in 
front of the Empangeni Independent E lectoral Commission (IEC) office in northern 
Nacal the afternoon before the elections began. The little shopping square was packed 
with !EC workers, mostly young people, waiting to get their first pay checks. The day 
was humid and people were tense, especially since some had been waiting si1!£e s!Jc and 
seven tbat morning for their checks to be processed. Suddenly, a grayish bottle liolding 
liquid and covered with rags was rolled onto the pavement about 10-12 feet in front of 
me. S01neone yelled, "It's a bomb! Look out there's a bomb there!" People ran; they 
sta1npeded. One small woman in braces was knocked off her feet and nearly trampled. 
I ran toward the South African Police vehicle which I'd noticed earlier parked around 
the corner from the shopping square. I calmly said (with immense discipline) to the two 
SADF soldiers inside that I was an American observer. I bad my blue cap on, hut I 
showed my credentials nonetheless. I told them there was a bomb in front of the IEC 
headquarters and they should come. With due respect, I must say, they responded 
inunediately--one went directly to his radio, and the other to the back of the vehicle to 
grab a metal case. Within five minutes various South African armored vehicles arrived; 
first, an 'Impala' followed by several 'Hippos'--both are fast moving, tank-like vehicles 
111ounted on tall wheels and designed for urban and bush warfare. 2 From the Impala 
came several men from the bo1nb unit. They identified the bottle as a bomb, contained 
it, and sealed off the area. \Ve ,vere lucky; the bomb failed to detonate. One of the 
SADF, a tall, very young, very Aryan ,nan, asked me, a little sarcastically, if I wanted a 
souvenir for the States. I thanked him but declined the offer. 
It is important to understand and contextualize the violence in South Africa. Its nature 
and origin must be illuminated and examined. There needs to be 111uch more clari ty 
about what causes the violence. It is now axio1natic, particularly in the USA, that the 
violence in South Africa (like the violence throughout the African continent and maybe 
wherever black people reside) is consistently perceived as "black on black," stemming 
from some primordial set of African instincts and passions. As Southern African 
historian and scholar, D r. Lisa Brock points out in a recent article, 
A content analysis of the three major television news networks, the 
top three news journals, as well as the twelve most widely read 
newspapers reveals ... that news reports have largely portrayed the 
conflict between Inkatha and anti-apartheid activists (the ANC, 
UDF and COSATU members and supporters) as 'black-on-black 
'Like razor wire and the razor wire spreading n1achine, these vehicles are unique ly 
the products of South African militarism. They were invented out of the necessity of 
going through hundreds of tiny cardboard shacks or doing crowd control "~th large mobs 
of rock throwing youth. 
' 
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violence', 'tribal violence,' or 'factional fighting.'' 
In the article she poses the question, "why has the image of tribal warfare in South 
Africa become the most persistent image from South Africa (and Africa in general)?" 
Noting that the "western media creates the in1ages, the phrases, and the par<}@gm_s that 
encapsulate African affairs," she concludes in a powerful argun1ent: · · · 
The inlages of irrational, tribal, primordial inclinations and warfare 
provide the smoke and mirrors . . . [they] reflect a convergence of 
market policy of news makers with the interest of powerful 
corporations, white South African leaders, and Western racial 
mythology. 
But the reality of the violence in South Africa is far more complex than a media blip of 
snarling African men with spears, just as the drug-related violence in urban America is 
more multi-faceted than a few, young, heavily armed black men riding around in white 
stretch lilnousines. 
In general, the violence in South Africa bas largely been concentrated in black 
residential areas and bas 111anifested itself in three primary forms: 1) armed 
confrontations between contending small and large groups; 2) violence triggered by an 
event, such as a mass march, funeral or gathering; or 3) low intensity conflict. 
Categorizing the violence tends to be unproductive since much of it is all linked together. 
However, it is this third type of violence, which includes inter-racial violence, that is the 
most ominous. For it is here that one sees the role which the apartheid state 
consistently played from the late 1970s onward by producing, maintaining and 
distributing violence. 
For instance, during the time I was in South Africa, news broke through the Goldstone 
Commission that one of the largest regular sources of automatic weapons had been the 
parastratal agency called the Electricity Supply Commission (EsKom). To cite but one 
case--in late March the electricity utility sold 1,000 semi-automatic rifles to Inkatha's 
chief police training official, Mr. Phillip Powell, for the sum of 2.1 million rand. Thereby 
giving the two interm.ediaries involved a profit of 1.4 million rand. 
The EsKom revelation bas led to other parastatals like ISCOR (the Iron and Steel 
Corporation) and SaSol revealing that they too, as part of the 1980 National Keypoints 
3see Brock, Lisa, "Inkatha: Notions of the 'Primitive' and 'Tribal' in Reporting on 
South Africa," in 1-lawk, B., ed., Africa's Media Image (Praeger, 1992). 
. ' 
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Act designed to stop the ''total onslaught,"4 kept stocks of thousands of weapons beyond 
those issued to employees {the scale of the problem is made clear by the fact that the 
National Keypoints Secretariat n1anaged 7,850 security personnel at various keypoi:nt 
sites). What should be noted about South Africa during the apartheid years is the South 
African state created one of the world's n1ost successful arms industries by utj!izing huge, 
state subsidies. The fact that some South African war products like the GS ~iid 06 long 
range artillery, armored cars, the Rooivalk helicopter, and mine detection equipment, are 
among.~t the world's n1ost popular military and policing equipment attests to the lengths 
to which the state would go to promote and sustain the armaments indLtstry. 
Further evidence of the state's responsibility for many of South Africa's 15,000 political 
deaths since 1990 was provided in the March 1994 Goldstone Commission's report. A 
full discussion of the scale and sophistication of this collaboration is beyond the 
objectives of this commentary. Several key points however, must be n1entioned: South 
African Police officers were identified as a n1ajor mode for transferring weapons from 
RENAMO in Mozan1bique to lnkatha in South Africa; the Commission presented to tbe 
public concrete and undeniable proof "that members of South Africa's security forces, 
especially the South African Police (SAP) and the KwaZulu Police (KZP) had stoked, 
sustained and orchestrated violence aimed at thwarting tbe country's de1nocratic 
transformation (Weekly Mail and Guardian, March 25-30, 1994); the Conlillission 
highlighted convincing evidence that elements of the KZP bad been and still were 
involved in bit squad activities in Natal and the Transvaal; lastly, the Commission 
showed that in the core of attacks only a few months previously in the Esakhawini area 
of Northern Natal, "survivors of several massacres ca1ne back later in their capacities as 
KZP police,neo to investigate the crime." 
Less thao a week before the start of the elections, the man and political organization 
most observers identify as tbe main source of South Africa's political violence, Chief 
Gatsha Buthelezi and tbe lnKatha Freedom Party (IFP) awiounced a reversal of their 
previous position. They decided to field a slate of candidates for both the national and 
provincial elections. This development was major and dramatic. It is undoubtedly the 
single most important reason that the South African election's were conducted in an 
atmosphere of relative peace and calm. In fact, tbe total number of deaths nation-wide 
Linked to the election process between January and May 1994 was only 103. While the 
election days themselves were notably without the levels of violence present only days 
before the elections began, violence and the threat of ,~olence remains a constant factor 
in South Africa. 
4This phrase was used by the South African goverrunent from J 977 on to describe 
what they believed was an offensive against South Africa led by the forces of 
international communism ranging from the Soviet Union and Cuba to the United 
Nations, the World Council of Churches and various city governments throughout the 
United States. 
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Violence manifests itself in many ways as an everyday feature of life in South Africa. 
Even more than in the United States, in most conllllunities, but especially in the white 
areas, guns are like pencils and pens. Everyone has them. At many white churches in 
the Orange Free State there are special canisters and racks to leave your guns ( off, but 
accessible) as you worship. There are jokes about adolescents taking ballroOIJ1 dancing 
and constantly colliding with a gun. Restaurants and schools, especially· in ,vhite ireas, 
have racks where you hang your guns as you enter. lo the late 1980s, just before the 
release of Nelson Mandela and the unbannings of the major African political 
organizations, South Africa's mil.lion plus legal gun holders owned an approx.in1ate 2.5 
million band held firearms with 200,000 new firearm licenses being issued each year. 
And this was the rate before the release of Nelson Mandela! 
Most observers point to the Buthelezi decision to participate and/or to the massive 
deployment of South African security forces--especially the South African army and 
South African Defense Force (SADF)--as the main reasons for the success of South 
Africa's elections. Others focus on the extent to which the elections were conducted with 
maximal, international public visibility, i.e., the more than 10,000 international media 
personnel, the 5,000 international observers and the 30,000+ national monitors and 
observers. I contend that the real reason South Africa was able to conduct its elections 
was the political will of the South African people. Perhaps, future generations of 
scholars will identify these April 1994 days as South Africa's defining n1oment as a 
nation. Tue visual inlages, the film footage, the photographs of the long, long lines, the 
hilltops re-molded with row after row of people waiting hours and days to vote, all these 
images simply cannot convey the significance of the South African elections. 
Descriptions highlighting "the power," "the grace," "the impact," of South Africa's 
mobilization for those three April days cannot succeed in acurately describing the story. 
Cheryl Carolus, the ANC's overall policy coordinator, believes that the strength of the 
South African democractic process lies in "the existence of a vibrant civil society." 
Moreover, in a powerful and pentrating recent speech to a conference jointly sponsored 
by the African American Institute and Peggy Dulany, Cheryl notes another characteristic: 
Another strength in South Africa is that we are a people who 
know how to make ourselves ungovernable. And it's a 
wonderful strength precisly because despite the facist nantre 
of the previous regime, not only did we n1anage to get on 
with our Uves, but we managed to build alternative structures 
which have shaped and even built the moral fabric of our 
society today.5 
5
"The Real Stn1ggle Begins", by Cheryl Carolus Africa Report, July-August, 1994. 
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I understand fuUy what Cheryl is saying. In one school house voting station in 
Natal, I watched, the whole room watched, barely breathing, as an old man was 
brought in on a stretcher made from so1ueone's wooden door and white plastic: 
USAID corn sacks. The stretcher was lowered to the floor r ight in the nliddle of 
the room. It was all the wrong procedure. The old roan was entitled to pri~~y as 
he cast bis ballot. He rose up a bit on his elbows. 1'he polling station's pot- · ·· 
bellied, balding, white presiding officer walked over--a little less officiously than 
usual, without his cigar for once. The old man rose a bit further and said in his 
tenor voice 
with a slight 
crack, "I am 
here to vote 
for Mr. 
Mandela." It 
was a 
declaration, 
not a 
statement. 
Certainly no 
longer a hat-
in-band-
head-bowed-
request to a 
white. The 
official 
. . . 
i The 1?nily G reat . !': • · • • • .• t •·: 
· By Stephen Spe11der 
' ' . -., .. ; . ; . .; 
Ne.ar th~ snow, ne~r the sun, in the.highest fields, 
.. See' how these natnes are feted by the waving grass 
. Arid o.y the $!reamers of white cl dud 
.. And wbjspers of \\find in 1he listening sky . . 
• The names of .those who in their lives fought for life, 
• Who wore at their. hearts . the fire's centr.e: . . 
' . Boin of the sun, they travelled a short while (()ward the SUI} 
.. And left lbe vivid air. signed with tiheir. honour. .. . .. 
~ .... . ,.. . .. , 
_, . ' 
' 
brought a ballot and asked the old roan to point to his choice. In response and 
clearly with great pain, a skinny arm extended and took the white man's arm 
bringing the ballot closer to his eyes. After a long time, during which everything 
stopped in the room, the same scratchy voice said, "that one sir" and an ashy bony 
finger was placed on top of Mandela's caricature. The old man laid back down 
saying to the still hushed room, "now I can die." 
I realized that day that this was what the South African elections were about. 
They were a moment within a historical process. They were an integral part of 
that process, just as the deaths of Steve Biko, Ruth First, Neil Aggett, Dulcie 
September, Lal Naidoo, Joe Quabi, Claire Stewart, Amy Biehl, and so many 
others. Part of the process like all those people wbose images I saw and dreamed 
about throughout the days and nights I was in South Africa. The elections and 
these departed friends were organicaUy and inextricably part of "the river" which is 
South Africa's history and process. I thin.k here about the image of "the river" 
because of the force and power of this assemblage of people. The voters catUe 
out in numbers that were overwhelnlingly beyond any and all predictions. Near 
En1pangeni, Natal, as I stood watching the lines soaking around a hillside, I asked 
one trade unionist organizer--a womai1 who had been a unionist for thirty years--
8 
why she thought so many were voting. She answered, "because they murdered 
Chr is Hani. They made a mistake then," she said, "a big one. The old people in 
the lines have been singing a song. It means something Uke, you can blow out a 
candle, but you can't blow out a fire." 
Sou th Africa--The Path Ahead 
It is now several mornings after South Africa's April, 1994 e lections. There is a 
new parliament and a new cabinet (the full membership is appended to thls 
report) under the leadership of a man who is undisputedly the world's most 
popular and charismatic political figure. But all is not nirvana in Africa's 
southern tip. Given the physical, social and economic infrastructure of inequality 
which will remain for n1any years to come, South Africa is now entering the most 
difficu lt part of "the river." The Washington Office on Africa recently quoted 
renowned South African sociologist, Francis '-Ni lson, as saying in a speech to the 
Southern African Grantmakers Network that South Africa, now emerging from 
apartheid, is like the US when it emerged from slavery. He sta ted, "We don't 
want to make "the same mistakes you made in returning to inequality under a new 
guise." Today's South Africa is facing the structural inequities and injustices of 
centuries of racial oppression. Realities like poverty ( over half of all African 
fami lies earn less than $190 per month), unemployment (with seven million 
unemployed, the unemployment rate among job seeking blacks is a nlinimum of 
50%), illitera<.:y (the rural South African illiteracy rare is over 66%), homelessness 
(7.7 million people homeless= 1 out of every 3.5 inhabitants) and health problems 
(South Africa's HIV infection rate doubles every 13 n1onths and less than 20% of 
blacks--compared to more than 80% of. whites--have medical insurance)6 are what 
motivated President Nelson Mandela to observe, wi th the particular clarity he 
brings to political phenomena, at Clark Atlanta University nine months before the 
elections: 
\Vhlle providing the rights associated with democracy, our 
constitution should also create the basis for ao expanding floor of 
entitlements so as to accord every citizen that rneasure of dignity 
intrinsic to being human. A den1ocratic constitution must address the 
issues of poverty, inequality, deprivation and want in accordance with 
internationally recognized standards of the indivisibility of human 
rights. A vote without food, shelter and health care would be to 
create the appearance of equality while actual inequal ity is 
6For further sobering details, see the chart appended to this report from William 
Minter's May 16, 1994 In These T imes ar ticle, reprinted in Covert Action Quarterly, 
Sum.mer 1994. 
• 
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entrenched. We do not want freedom without bread, nor do we ,vant 
bread without freedom. 
President Mandela's reflection, in fact, brings me to a major concern l have about South 
Africa as I look at the path ahead. It is related to the so-called 'Mandela facior', i.e., 
: C...:.. • • 
what happens if and when "Madhiba," as he is affectionately known, is no longer lhere. I 
have no doubt that there is a plan in place. Further, I have tremendous respect for the 
organization and leadership skil ls of other leaders, like Cheryl Carolus, Cyril Ramaposa, 
Pallo Jordan, Frene Ginwala, "Bantu" Holomisa, and "Tokyo" Gabriel Sexwale, premier 
of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereniging (PWY) region. Amongst these and many 
others--inside and outside of the parlia1nent and the government7--is a quality of 
leadership, conunitment and vision that rero.inds one of what black A1nerican theologian 
and civil rights activist, Vincent Harding, calls "signposts"--people whose lives open doors 
beyond darkness. There is also an impressive style of collective leadership and mutual 
consultation. Both this caliber of leadership and the style are sadly absent in the USA 
While there, I discussed leadership and how to develop the capacity for leadership many 
times. Ironically, the many visits there of certain US personalities has made South 
African activists very sensitive to a point made by Comel West in Race Matters: 
We need leaders--neither saints nor sparkling television 
personalities--who can situate themselves within a larger historical 
narrative of this country and our world, wbo can grasp the con1plex 
dynamics of our peoplehood and imagine a future grounded in the 
best of our past, yet who are attuned to the frightening obstacles 
that now perplex us. 
Nonetheless, despite the strength of the leadership--symbolized in the very persona of the 
unmatched Nels on Mandela and derived from training experiences like the university 
which Mandela, Mbeki, Sisulu and many others created in their Robben Island prison 
cells--! have two strong concerns about the choices which are being made by South 
Africa's leadership. The first is a certain parochialism and 1nyopic vision in terms of 
crucial questions regarding South Africa's relationship with Southern Africa and regional 
growth and development. The second is the South African leadership's perspective on 
the growing USA-South African connection. 
In regard 10 the first point, Jet us remind ourselves that for years tbe neighboring 
Southern African people and nations have paid with lost lives and destroyed 
infrastructures for the solidarity which they gave to the South African liberation struggle. 
7A full list of the South African cabinet is appended to this note. A growing issue 
voiced by some is that too many leaders have been taken from key grassroots, labor and 
church organizations to serve in the governn1ent, leaving those constituencies without 
direction and experienced leadership. 
• 
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Mozambique and Angola paid (and continue to pay) a particularly high portion of the 
bill rendered by South African apartheid violence. It is a genocidally tragic tally that has 
resulted in 1.6 million lives being lost; more than 11 million people, largely women and 
children, being made homeless; over 750,000 children orphaned or abandoned; and at 
least $60 billion in war damage to roads, bridges, schools, factories, nlines, fil!Q 
development projects. As renowned South African lawyer and hun1an rights scholar, 
Albie Sachs put it to an audience in Mozambique: "I hope you, our friends in Frelimo in 
·particular, get so1ne pride in tern1s of what is happening in South Africa today because 
you paid a terrible price. Half the problems today stem from the fact that you 
challenged apartheid in South Africa and you gave us support." But is Albie Sach's 
observation the shared feeling of most of South Africa's citizenry? Of its new 
leadership? Renowned scholar and activist, Dot Keet of the University of the Western 
Cape (UWC, aka "the university of the working class") shared with me her fear that 
rather than being a partner for development of the region, South Africa nlight become 
the agency for continuing donlination of the region and deepened patterns of 
exploitation--even if stemming from ebony instead of ivory hands. 
Sometimes the leadership of the ANC is much less than 'thoughtful' in both public and 
private utterances about their participation in the region. When I was in South Africa 
during tbe beady atmosphere of the elections, I was sturuied--as were many others--to 
bear Adelaide Tambo, prominent female ANC spokesperson and wido\v of the late 
President Oliver R. ·ra1nbo, say in a press interview "to hell with the region," when she 
was asked about how the ANC intended to assist with the Southern African region's 
multitudinous development problems. One day in an elevator, I ran into l\vo ANC staff 
people whom I've known for many years. I met them when, as refugees, they were 
hosted by first Tanzania, then Zambia, then Angola. They noticed that I had my bags 
and asked how I could possibly be leaving prior to Mandela's inauguration celebration. I 
explained that I was en route to Maputo to talk about the elections coming up there. 
They replied (at first I thought they were joking, but then I soberly realized they were 
not), "Oh, is Mozambique having elections too?" 
While there may be problems of a n1yopic political vision and parochialism amongst 
some of the ANC leadership, I think that the top leadership in the country·· 
governmental and nongovernmental--ren1ains committed to a political perspective that 
embraces Southern Africa and not just the Republic. Clearly, this is the case witb 
President l'v!andela as evidenced in the early July Pretoria meeting he hosted to bring 
together the Presidents of Zaire, Angola and Mozambique. The same regional 
orientation was to be found in the July 21 state visit (his first ever) which President 
Mandela paid to the Mozambican capital, Maputo. During the state visit, besides sigrling 
a n1ulti-faceted cooperation pact covering defense, transport, agriculture and research, 
President Mandela comnlitted South Africa to both assistance with the rebuilding of all 
the countries destabilized by South Africa (including Angola) and to eventually formally 
• 
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joining in SADC (the Southern Africa Development Con1IDunity).8 Interestingly, the 
trade union leadership, especially the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) consistently embraces and demonstrates more regional solidarity than those 
in exile in regional locations, given the fact that so many of them inside the country were 
often cut off from hard information because of apartheid censorship. This is~\le will 
come forward more often as the idea of the new South Africa paying reparaiions:'to 
Angola receives more attention. 
As John Saul, author of the recently published Recolonization and Resistance: Southern 
Africa in the 1990's and long time colleague/participant/observer says, "Now for the 
hard part, that is the challenges before the new post-apartheid goverrunent." The second 
n1ajor concern I have, i.e., the plunging roller coaster which is the growing connection 
between the USA and the RSA (Republic of South Africa) brings me to the final section 
of this commentary. How the substance, direction and quality of the bilateral relations 
between South Africa and the United States will finally evolve is one of various serious 
challenges which the new South Africa now faces. 
TI1e East-West Cold War paradigm that drove US policy towards South Africa and 
Africa in general is now largely dead. It has been replaced by a new framework in which 
development in South Africa is motored by a market economy awash with McDonald's 
and coke bottles. As Vice President Al Gore stated ( opening by citing, ironically, 
W.E.B. DuBois' historic contribution) on inauguration eve at Johannesburg's Market 
Theater in a speech that deserves to be quoted at length: 
For the United States, this transformation (the dismantling of 
apartheid) has special significance. After all, for decades Americans 
agonized over the horrors of our own apartheid.... \Ve start on this 
partnership from a strong similarity and outlook. President-to-be 
Mandela ... has committed himself and bis government to an 
economic policy and progran1 that eschews failed ideologies ... the 
businessmen and women of the United States are genuinely 
excited.... We know how good it can be.... We want 'io join South 
Africans in helping to rebuild the economy ... to expand opportunities 
for the previously disadvantaged to be successful entrepreneurs in 
8SADC's current membership is: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Moza111hique, 
Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zi.Inbabwe. South Africa joining SADC in a 
substantive and serious way could be an extraordinary development. In 1990, for 
instance, South Africa's GNP was $102 billion, three times as much as the $30 biUion 
dollars combined GNP of the ten current SADC members. The additional point to bear 
in mind though is that it is not automatic that South Africa joining SADC will lead to a 
strengthened SADC and more equitable and sustainable development throughout the 
region. 
' 
12 
order to share in the dynamic growth of the economy. 
Perhaps a Christian Science Monitor article (June 6, 1994) said it best when it ;headlined 
"US Pushes South Africa as a Model." The accelerating US involvement in South Africa 
is not directed at the 7 million homeless South Africans or the 25% living in itbject 
J e.... " poverty. Rather, as James Hackney, counsellor to US Secretary of ComJnerce Ron 
Brown, notes (in the article cited above): " ... we're l9oking at a $20 billion opportunity 
for foreign firms over the next four to five years." Many key US firms are yet to venture 
towards South Africa. For them, Africa remains a continent non grata. And sadly, many 
now advancing on South Africa do so moved by the opportunity to cut some deals (see 
the June 5, 1994 Washington Post article entitled "USIA Hosts Deal-Making Conference 
for US and South African Firms") rather than make a contribution to South Africa's 
reconstruction and growth .. 
So it is that I left South Africa concerned about the McDonaldization going on, a process 
of absorbing all things American that is building upon a long and developed historical 
tendency to Jove and emulate 'the Yanks!' As I traveled around South Africa this trip 
and kept seeing the US automobiles, television shows, C.D.s, fashions, ,novies, 100,000 
phrase super talk barbies, computers, etc., I kept hearing in my head the Michael Jordan 
'Be Like Mike' ditty. 
My concern is derived not only from the fact that the log cabin-to-white house mythology 
has not worked any to well for large segments of the USA population. Nor is it just the 
product of serious doubt that the Clinton administration at the end of the day will 
produce what it says it will pro.duce (For example, the so-called new policy towards 
A,ngola has not resulted in any substantive change in policy). And already facts like how 
the $600 1nillion new funds Clinton promised South Africa ,vill, in reality, simply be old 
funds drawn from moneys promised to other African countries make me join Africa 
Policy Information Center Director, Imani Countess when she observes "the most 
substantive changes contemplated seem to be organizational (and ornamental) rather 
than substantive, perhaps a trip by President Clinton to the new South African success 
story.'" ·· 
My concern about the USA-RSA nexus also stems from the scale and complexity of the 
problems which South Africa confronts. In I 991 the US government committed to help 
Mozambique with its crises through a massive infusion of aid. That year 3,000 foreign 
technicians earned $180 million, three times the entire wage bill of Mozambique's 
• Are we going to now take funds designated for crisis aid in places like Rwanda and 
shift it to South Africa or are we going to now shift newly promised South Africa-bound 
funding and shift it back to Rwanda? Obviously, what is missing is major commitment to 
Africa on the part of US decision makers. "Dead African children are like dead flies to 
the Americans," one friend in Maputo siad to me. 
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100,000 member civil service including teachers and health care workers. How, in light 
of this record and what I know of the USA, I find myself at times querying, will flooding 
South Africa with US technicians, consultants and peace corps help address tasks like 
creating training programs and jobs for 2.5 million people over tbe next 5 to 10 years? 
Or another case, what wisdom can the US offer, given US attitudes towards 112vernment 
intervention into health care, ii1 a situation where to create a mininnun health delivery 
system in South Africa will require an initial government injection of $300 million per 
year? 
Challenges: Old, Continuing and New 
President Nelson Mandela said in bis inspiring and poetic May 10 inaugural speech that 
"our daily deeds as ordinary South Africans must produce an actual South African realily 
that will reinforce humanity's belief in justice, strengthen its confidence in the nobility of 
the human soul and sustain all our hopes for a glorious life for all .... " He closed by 
saying tbat "the sun shall never set on so glorious a buman achievement." 
Related to President Mandela's epiphany and an illustration of its application to 
"ordinary South Africans" is a story that a friend told me. He said that he and his father 
were in a medium sized food shop purchasing on the first day of elections. The shop 
was crowded for such an early morning. But then, it was a special day. Suddenly, it 
became a bit quiet when an older, homeless, 'coloured lady,' wearing a warm red shawl , 
began pan-handling all the customers and employees, a little in the celebrant n1ode. 
Each of them gave her something and steadily the realization grew that nearly all had 
done that. They, especially a fat n1anager, began to hassle her, telling her it was time to 
leave and that she couldn't keep getting food off each of them. The old lady walked out 
in a slow dignified march. When she reached the doorway, she turned and pointed her 
finger at all of them. She said, voice rising to the occasion, ".Mandela's taking over 
tomorrow. He's coming to take care of each and every one of you people!!" Then she 
turned, squared her shoulders, shook her butt and left. 
What Madhiba's words and tbe old woman's action together constitute is a telescopic 
view of the con1prehensiveness of the challenges facing the new South African 
government. Tremendous tasks lie ahead. First, there is the need co transform political, 
economic and social institutions which for the last three centuries have been the building 
blocks of apartheid. A system of social relations forged almost wholly within a racially-
based, socially engineered modality of super exploitation, must be turned into a non-
racist society. How to reach the goal of a non-racist, non-sexist society? The ANC has 
decided that by working with other political parties in a government of national unity, 
steps can be taken towards healing the bitter racial scars of white oppression while 
combining black aspirations and labor with white capital and know-bow, thus making 
South Africa a viable contributing partner in Africa. It has yet to articulate, however, 
detailed and specific plans for eliminating the racism and racial privilege and 
chauvinism that yet abounds throughout South Africa. 
14 
A related task that must be confronted in a radical, substantive and sustained manner is 
that of transforming South African society so that women can fully and equally 
participate. Today, the reality often totally contradicts the rhetoric of a non-racist; non-
sexist, non-homophobic society. Women are abused, objectified, exploited, and 
brutalized in all aspects of their lives. Ultimately, perhaps, the essential prer~quisite to 
J - • • 
asserting and achieving full equality and participation for women in South Africa ·is going 
to be the extent to which women organize, but in the meanwhile it must be noted that 
simply passing a non-sexist constitution and bill of rights is a far cry from the elimination 
of gender oppression and exploitation. 
Secondly, the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) must be implemented in 
a timely and highly public fashion. It is fully understood by almost all in South Africa 
that the election victory is only a first step, that electing Nelson Mandela is meaningless; 
it is urinating on the graves of all those who sacrificed their lives unless real change 
begins to appear confronting the daily misery which most black South Africans face. 
Apartheid in a sense was non-discriminating. Whether through the inequality it 
ensconced, the underdevelopment and ignorance it sowed, or the violence it inculcated 
as the synapse of all people's existence, "there is not a single sector of South African 
society, nor a person living in South Africa untouched by the ravages of apartheid." 
Moreover, just as millions of South Africans suffered as a result of apartheid policies, 
practices and violence, mill.ions of ordinary South Africans also struggled in various ways 
against apartheid. Because of this legacy of mass struggle and mass aspirations, the 
ANC adopted an approach to change linking "growth," "development," "reconstruction," 
and "redistribution" into one unified program based on the concept that their people with 
their aspirations and collective determination are their most important resource. The 
five key elements of the RDP are : 
• meeting basic needs 
• developing human resources 
• building the economy 
• democratizing the state and society 
• and most of all, implementing the RDP 
It is an ambitious undertaking and many, many details ren1ain to be fully understood, let 
alone introduced into people's everyday lives. But the 39 billion Rand ($11 billion US) 
RDP is, at minimum, a plan to provide jobs, houses, education and health care to the 
millions brutalized by apartheid. Indeed, some aspects of the RDP are breath takingly 
ambitious and as I listened to people explain it throughout the country, I wondered why 
we in the world's richest country could not share the admirable aim of goals like seeing 
everyone live in a house. 
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True enough, the RDP will be difficult to actualize, but it represents a generalized will 
to put seven million people now in squatter camps into a million units of low-cost 
housing in the next five years; a will to electrify 2.5 million households by the year 2000 
despite the constraint of a shrinking economy and a growing world recession. Most of 
all, what strikes me as adntirable and unique is that the RDP results from a .erocess of 
envisionn1ent and participation that took place throughout tbe country over a· period of 
more than a year. The RDP also continues an impressive tradition of consulting with 
people and providing the political space for people to participate that was started in 1955 
when thousands of Africans, coloured, Indians and whites gathered defiantly at Kl iptown, 
outside Johallllesburg, to debate and adopt the world-renown Freedon1 Charter. 
A thi rd major challenge which faces the new South Africa is what I identify as the 
disarming of South African society. l t entails the demilitarization of South Africa, the 
denuclearization of tbe country and gaining control over a defense and arms industry 
gone wild. Several days spent with a South African brigadier, who had led SADF forces 
in Angola, Namibia, and Soweto gave me much insight into the nature of the military 
mindset in South Africa. \Ve were together at the May, 1994 Cairo Conference on 
Peace Keeping in Africa sponsored by the International Peace Academy. I was sitting 
behind the brigadier and I listened as he derisively mocked every plan brought forward 
for introducing multilateral peacekeeping contingents into confict situations so as to 
minimize loss. "My perspective," be said, "is simple. You must simply deploy the boys 
better armed, better equipped, better trained, better led, better fighters and ready to run 
it." His forces bad learned from the Americans in Vietnam that the best kind of 
peacekeeping was "grab them by the balls and the hearts and minds will follow!" 
Indications of the scale of conversion that must take place in South Africa are also 
evident in the amazing information that is now being unearthed about bow sophisticated 
South Africa's military and nuclear programs have become. David Albright's article in 
the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (June 1994) about South Africa's six gun-type, easily 
transported nuclear weapons built by government-owned Armscor are but the proverbial 
tip of the iceberg in terms of potential South African military and nuclear capacity. And 
the intensity of the debate now raging in South Africa aboui how to convert from a war-
centered polity to a n1ore normalized country where war i.s a component part, is at a 
level far deeper and more generalized than the conversion debate being conducted in the 
USA Tbe quotations below, excerpted from a discussion paper "The Annan,ents 
Industry Debate: A Cost Benefit Approach" (June, 1994), give a flavor of the challenge. 
Currently, the paper is being circulated in the ANC's Department of Econo1nic Planning . 
... Arms control policy must stem from foreign policy, not the o ther 
way round. Unless this happens, the battle-testing in countries like 
Yugoslavia, and arms exports to countries like Rwanda could 
dan1age our post apartheid credibility.... Today many nations that 
have invested heavily in defence in the past have turned their 
attention to converting defence activities into competitive 
' 
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commercial activity. While the results have not been promising, 
South Africa should also seek to establish how the heavy investment 
in militarisn1 of the past can be turned into civilian focused benefits. 
Government is especially important in this regard since defense 
conversion requires a nation effort." 
A fourth immediate challenge facing South Africa is that of the local level elections 
scheduled for the fall of 1994. Presumably, these will not be conducted until conditions 
permit them to be held simultaneously in towns and nJTal areas throughout the country. 
And theoretically already in place are transitional local authorities who are to deal with 
administration and maintenance of local services (roads, water, electricity, sewage, 
drainage, fire departments, hospitals, n1useums, etc.) until the local elections are held. 
These transitional local authori ties were to emerge from local level negotiations being 
held throughout the country, a process which usually involved black township 
representation or the civic associations ("civics") negotiating with nearby white city 
councils. However, there are problems, big ones. The immediate problems have been 
both juridical and political. They have involved delineating boundaries of authority, 
where cities end, where suburbs begin, how the political parties get integrated into the 
process and bow the newly evolving local authorities relate to provincial and national 
structures. There are also essentially political problems like getting white councils to 
negotiate in good faith with black communities or getting black local residents to end 
years of rent boycotts and other tax resistance traditions so as to garner the revenues 
needed to run the new society's services and facilities (incidentally, in the midst of all 
this, South Africa's right wing has determined that local government will be their new 
strategic terrain on which to contest for power in many key areas). These are problems 
linked to the much bigger ones discussed ealier like the de-racialization of society. 
But in a way the local elections challenge is not an unpredictable one. As with other 
tasks, like creating a new national and inclusive culture reflective of all the rich mosaic 
of peoples, languages, and habits which South Africa offers, this is part of the new 
pathway which is being travelled in South Africa. President. Mandela, a long tune 
student of other situations where there was harsh and qu ick transition from liberation 
movement to government, pointed out in his May 9 address at Cape Town that the "task 
on hand would not be easy." And, in general, the mood amongst thirty year friends and 
colleagues that I talked to when I was there for those days, while jubilant, also contained 
a measure of grim acknowledgement that ahead are the (llOSt difficult portions of the 
journey. It's all part of waking up in the morning in the new South Africa. 
Pallo Jordan, a pal from Madison, Wisconsin during bis exiled childhood (before being 
banished from the USA), now the Minister of Posts, Telecommunication and 
Broadcasting, said to me as he embraced 1ne at a 1nid-elections celebration, "now I 
understand why the Angolans changed their slogan fron1 'A Luta Continua. A Vitoria e 
Certa!' [I'he stn1ggle continues. Victory is Certain] to 'A Vitoria Continua. A Luta e 
Certa!' [Victory is a continuous (process). Struggle will definitely he there]. 
' 
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f'em ando Molcrcs/hnpact Visuals 
Poverty and homelessness ·.will challenge the new ANC 
government. The legacy of inequality and deprivation from 
apartheid South Africa is staggering: 
~- The GDP growth rate has declined from almost 6% in the 1960s, to 4%. 
. 1n ihe.1970s, to barely 1 % in the 198Qs. 
-~ . . .Per,dipita income has d~liried i~ each of the past12 years. ,·· ·. 
,:} . • 'o~er· half of black .families and 2.6% of white families live in extreme .:;, 
·' pove;ty. · ···,. · : ' :: .. 
• At least 7 million are homeless. 
• .Millions of blacks Jive in shacks with no sewage systems, water, or 
electricity. 
• Half the population is illiterate. 
• Malnutrition causes 61 % of infant deaths a1nong black families. 
• Per capital income for whites is 9.5 times higher th~n for blacks, 4.5 times 
higher than fo r mixed races, and 3 tin1es higher than that for Asians. 
• Of the 36 countries for which data are avai lable, it has the most unequal 
development: The poorest 40% of households earn 4% of total income, 
the richest I 0% earned n1ore than 50%. 
• Only 1.6%ofdirectorships in the top lOOcompanieson the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) are held by black Africans. 
• Five corporations own 80% of all s tocks traded on the JSE. 
• Of the 3 black-owned con1panies traded, nvo ,vere establish.:d last year. 
• All black-owned businesses account for less th,1n l '?tof econon1icoutput. 
• Black Africans fill l %of senior rnanagen1en t positions, co,npared to 98% 
held by ,vhites. 
• Fe,ver than 10% of the 700,000 A Frie.in busin,~s~es ,ire in n1:111ufacw ri ng 
or related fields. 
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